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1.1 Introduction
Economic inequality has been an important and extensively studied aspect in the 
market economy systems. On one hand, it is the mainstream political consen-
sus in developing countries that inequality is an inevitable price for economic 
growth (see, Kuznets 1955; Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa 1999; Castello´ 
and Dome´nech 2002). On the other hand, a growing body of literature shows that 
inequality slows down economic growth(e.g., Galor and Zeira 1993; Persson and 
Tabellini 1994; Aghion and Bolton 1997). Among various measures of inequality, 
wage inequality has been perceived as one of the most important one in the pro-
cess of economic development and globalization. Through the lens of Heckscher-
Ohlin trade theory, more exposure to global market should have increased the
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relative demand of less-skilled workers in the developing countries and then lead
to a decrease in wage inequality. However, empirical studies on developing coun-
tries failed to find evidence for it. A wide range of studies show there are no
better-off for less skilled workers, at least compared with those with higher skills
(e.g., Sa´nchez-Pa´ramo and Schady 2003; Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2004;
Hsieh and Woo 2005; Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007; Verhoogen 2008; Amiti and
Cameron 2012; Whalley and Xing 2014). What accounts for this apparent puz-
zle? Is the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin theory too stylized to reveal the fact
in developing economies? Were there any other forces at work that might have
outperformed what globalization has on the wages in developing countries? What
kind of mechanism lies behind the relationship between globalization and wage
inequality? These questions remain to be addressed.
Many scholars tried to interpret the inconsistency between Heckscher-Ohlin
trade theory and growing wage inequality in developing countries. By now, the
most credible explanation involving documented wage inequality in developing
countries is the increasing demand for skilled workers induced by international
trade. Pissarides (1997) is one of the early papers arguing that the increasing
demand for skilled workers in developing countries is out from the skill-biased
technology occurred in international trade with developed countries. It also em-
phasizes that the relative demand for skilled labor during the transition follow-
ing liberalization is temporary, but skill-biased technology will bring long-lasting
gains to skilled workers. Papers in this line include Acemoglu (2003), who shows
the facts of increasing imports of machines and other capital goods from devel-
oped countries entail skilled workers raises the demand for skilled workers and
skill premium. Verhoogen (2008) argues that exporting firms require skilled work-
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ers to improve the quality of products, which drives the wage disparities between
skilled workers and unskilled workers. Theoretical frameworks underlying the
empirical work evolves to involve trade of intermediate products and international
flows of capital (e.g.,Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Amiti and Konings 2007; Amiti
and Cameron 2012). Recently, Burstein and Vogel (2017) show that skill-biased
technological change induced by the reduction in trade cost after liberalization re-
allocates factors across firms with different productivity and skill intensity within
sectors. It increase skill premium in all countries.
From an empirical point of view, one common implication of the skill biased
technology theory is, following a trade liberation, increasing demand for skilled
workers should be more salient in sectors or companies that are relatively more
intensive in skills. Empirically, distributional conflict in wage is extensively found
in developing countries (see Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007). It has been documented
on three broad levels: wage disparities among heterogeneous regions, workforce,
and firms. Theoretically, Bernard, Jensen and Lawrence (n.d.) first pointed out
that exporters inclined to be larger, higher in productivity and pay more than non-
exporters do. However, they were unable to determine what was the driving force
behind it. Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) then firstly theoretically introduced firm
heterogeneity into trade models and showed that the exposure to trade would only
induce more productive firms to export. Following Melitz and Ottaviano’s paper,
more and more literature has been relating wage inequality to firm heterogeneity
in, such as ownership, firm size, export status, trade participation, productivity. A
fast-growing strand of literature following firm heterogeneity addresses the mech-
anism between firm heterogeneity and wage inequality in the context of labor
market imperfections where worker forces’ fair-wage is taken into consideration.
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Akerlof and Yellen (1990) first came up with the fair-wage mechanism to explain
the unemployment. According to this theory, workers will withdraw their effort
on work if they feel their real wage can not live to up what they reserve. Eco-
nomic shocks, such as an increase in labor supply or productivity will affect the
unemployment of skilled and unskilled worker by the channel of wage dispari-
ties between workers with different skill level. Egger and Kreickemeier (2009),
assumes that whether or not wage considered to be fair relies on the productivity
level of the firm and so that higher productivity firms pay a higher wage. Selection
into exporting induced by trade liberation reinforce the expansion of productivity
of high productivity firms and increase their wage, widening the wage inequal-
ity within ex-ante identical workers across firms. An alternative line of literature
attributes the labor imperfection to search and matching frictions between firms
and workers (Pissarides 1974; Acemoglu 1999; Helpman and Itskhoki 2010; Fel-
bermayr, Prat and Schmerer 2011). One influential paper from Helpman, Itskhoki
and Redding (2010) argue, since it costs larger firms more to screen and maintain
high-ability workers, more productive firms pay higher wages. Despite the ap-
pealing theoretical inference, the fact that these literature are abstracting from ex-
ante worker heterogeneity, they cannot address how trade affects returns to worker
characteristics. In particular, Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) reports with
German data, that after controlling observable and unobservable characteristics of
the employees and of the workplace, wage inequality in between exporters and
non-exporters reduced from 36.6 percent to 2.2 percent. This finding shows that
differences in labor composition account for most of the exporter wage premium.
With the development of computer technology and the data matching em-
ployee and employer, a small but rapidly developing strand of literature tries to
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address the role that trade played in shifting returns to observable worker char-
acteristics (see,Acemoglu 1999; Albrecht and Vromani 2002; Costinot and Vogel
2010; Bils, Chang and Kim 2011; Sampson 2014). This literature has primarily
focused on matching exogenous skill demand heterogeneity and workforce ob-
servable. Acemoglu (1999) presents a matching of worker skills and the types
of job that firms create. It argues that change in the distribution of skill induces
firms to create more high-skill jobs (namely, changes in distribution of jobs) and
increase inequality. Following Acemoglu (1999), Albrecht and Vromani (2002)
also assumes matching of workers’ skills with jobs’ skill requirements but slightly
loses standard setup in the former literature.
However, less attention has been paid to study the relative importance of the
(many) factors influencing wage inequality in a unified framework. The primary
challenge facing the empirical literature in this area is that heterogeneity of firms,
workers, occupations, and products emphasized in theoretical arguments implies
the need for highly disaggregated data. Such data is in need for detailed informa-
tion on firm-level characteristics. However, what is missing now is the matched
data between firm and worker, firm and product, worker and job, which is crucial
for the sake of establishing a connection between inequality questions and firms’
or workers’ characteristics. Questions like: whether firms with higher productivity
hire better educated labor force; or whether production of higher quality products
demands high-skilled workers: or are the changes occurred in the composition of
workers and products accompanied by changes in return to workforces; remains
unsolved. Further empirical work with highly disaggregated data of firms, plants,
workers, occupations, even products heterogeneity is in need to answer the ques-
tions mentioned above. Moreover, a dynamic version of the model for analyzing
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the impact of trade in short-term and long-term is missing from the current stud-
ies. With the changing nature of globalization, the channels through which the
distribution of resources is affected change too. How labor markets adjust to dy-
namics of product market and ongoing globalization is worth studying.
Wage inequality among individuals is examined by applying various inequal-
ity decomposition methods to the individual data describing observable charac-
teristics of the work force. Most studies fail to find strong interaction between
observable characteristics of individual and wage inequality. One of these studies
is Appleton, Song and Xia (2014). It examines wage gaps by characteristics of
workers and jobs, such as education, experience, gender, and occupations, from
1988 to 2008 and finds that changes in worker characteristics play a relatively
less important role compared to other factors such as region, industry, and own-
ership. However, a detailed decomposition is arguably more important to detect
which factor matters more for the composition effects. For example, if wages are
more dispersed among younger and more educated workers, dispersion in certain
factors among these groups could increase due to the composition change linked
to the increasing young and more educated labor force. One major problem con-
cerning decomposition in wages between different worker force groups is that
the possibility of participation into labor market depends on unobservable char-
acteristics in different ways for different subgroups. Individuals have the choice
over which group they would love to belong to. In other words, self-selections
may matter in the subgroup decomposition. However, decomposition proposed
by Machado and Mata (2005) does not consider self-selection. While other stud-
ies have also applied decomposition to wage inequality in the 2000s, no similar
detailed decomposition exists for the period after 2008.
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To this end, this paper constructs annual, cross-section micro-data from China
with various measurements of wage inequality spanning 1999 -2013 to com-
prehensively evaluate the contribution of demographic attainment to changes in
wage inequality. China has experienced rapid economic growth over the past two
decades and is on the brink of eradicating poverty. However, wage inequality in-
creased sharply from the early 1980s and rendered China among the most unequal
countries in the world. We use two complementary decomposition techniques,
with each giving a different insight into the underlying force driving changes in
wage inequality to address the questions “what is the trend of wage inequality
following the trade liberalization”, “which subgroups’ changes in wage inequal-
ity attribute more ”, and “what factors account for more”. Our first decompo-
sition, following Fields (2003) and Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2016), implements
the regression-based method to identify the contribution of observable worker and
firm characteristics. One advantage of this decomposition is, other than the quan-
tile analysis, that it is done entirely non-parametrically with a more comprehensive
measure of inequality than the quantile differentials. Another advantage is that we
can measure the relative importance of each variable by deriving factor inequality
weights. This is totally different from other decomposition methods that take the
changes in prices or the changes in quantities as a group. Our second decompo-
sition, following Shorrocks (1984), applies sub-groups data to identify the roles
played by a specific workforce characteristics.
Our dataset updates to 2013 and provides a detailed decomposition of skill
premium. Appleton, Song and Xia (2014) computes sub-components of detailed
decomposition by sequentially switching the coefficients of quantile regressions
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for each covariant from estimated values in different years. However, it cannot
compute the sub-components of the compositional effects of detailed decompo-
sition. We find that wage inequality among private firms actually contributes far
more to the wage inequality across firms and the effects of FDI on skill premium
decrease as Chinese firms are further integrated into global economy of Chinese
economy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3 details of the data and
method we use for decomposition. In section 4, we illustrate our result. The last
section draws together the conclusion to answer key questions we raised in the
beginning and consider implication for future work.
1.2 Background of China’s Wage Inequality
It is widely known that rising inequality has been a serious concern for China.
Over the last decades, China has experienced rapid economic development and
in the meanwhile, widening wage disparities. What makes China different from
other countries is that first of all, China implemented the policy of “allowing some
people to get rich first and then help those lagged behind”, that is to encouraged
some people, some regions to become prosperous prior to others, so that to bring
along the latter prosperity and to achieve the common prosperity. Given this cir-
cumstance, spatial disparity shall have been salient between different regions.
Han, Liu and Zhang (2012) and Hering and Poncet (2010) show that proximity
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to consumers plays a statistically significant role in spatial wage inequality. In
particular, Whalley and Xing (2014) show spatial disparity in skill premia dis-
played different features among coastal regions and non-coastal regions between
1995 and 2008. They further argues that driving force behind the wage inequality
is changing and the acceleration of the growth of skill premia after 2002 is at-
tributed to the fact that the supply of skilled workers is outpaced by the demand
from China’s deeper integration into world economy. It remains to address what
is the driving force of spatial skill premia after 2008, when China experienced a
slower pace of economic growth after the financial crisis but a steady increase in
skilled labor supply (rate of population with education of high school increased
1.5%, where rate of population growth with college education increased 3.5% ).
Foreign direct investment and international trade have been assumed as plau-
sible explanations for the rise in the demand of skilled workers. Indeed, foreign
direct investment increased rapidly in China for the past decades. China has ben-
efited more than ever from FDI since adopting the ”open door” policy in the early
1980s. Min and Zhongli (2010) show that in 2002 and 2007, skill-biased tech-
nological progress accounted for, respectively, 17.32% and 22.51% of the wage
inequality in the industrial sector. Results from Chen, Ge and Lai (2011) indicate
that the presence of foreign investment exerted negative effect on the wage growth
in local firms, which widened the wage inequality among enterprises.
1.3 Data and Methodology
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We use four waves of urban household survey carried out by the Chinese House-
hold Income Project (CHIP) in 2000, 2003, 2009 and 2014, covering income
and expenditure information in 1999, 2002, 2008 and 2013 respectively. The
sample of CHIP comes from the big sample of the annual integration household
survey of National Bureau of Statistics. Datasets about individuals include
demographic variables such as household composition, gender, age, nationality,
marital status, communist party membership, educational history, and health
information, as well as economic variables such as employment information
including occupation, sector, annual income, working hours, job history, and
training. Given the stark economic disparity between different regions in China,
the provinces selected in this survey are from several distinct regions, including
eastern region, central region, and western region. In view of the increased
importance of rural-to-urban migration, the surveys from 2002 added questions
about rural-to-urban migrants. Rural-urban migrants are often paid significantly
less than urban residents, having been less educated and being more concentrated
in occupations that are often thought dirty, dangerous, and disreputable.
Here in our paper, we confine our discussion to wage/salary workers with
full-time jobs. Our measurements of wages are real monthly wages not including
bonuses or subsidies, nor non-monetary benefits such as housing or all kinds of
insurance. We then trim the top and bottom 1% of individual earners in each year
to remove the possible outliers.
Table 3.1 shows the general picture of inequality in urban wages from 1999
to 2013. In general, most measures during the last 20 years increased, indicating
increase in wage inequality. We specifically divided the data into before and
after the financial crisis in 2008. It is clearly shown that wage inequality shows
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Table 1.1: Urban wage inequality
1999 2002 2007 2008 2013
Percentile ration
p90/p10 4.282 4.889 5.375 4.500 5.833
p75/p25 2.147 2.267 2.616 2.273 2.400
p90/p50 1.916 2.075 2.389 2.250 2.258
p10/p50 0.447 0.425 0.444 0.387 0.500
Gini coefficient 0.293 0.335 0.364 0.335 0.353
Generalized entropy
GE(-1) 1.056 0.249 0.273 0.210 0.455
GE(0) 0.164 0.194 0.221 0.183 0.244
GE(1) 0.139 0.187 0.221 0.189 0.211
GE(2) 0.141 0.217 0.268 0.231 0.239
Atkinson index
A(0.5) 0.071 0.091 0.105 0.089 0.106
A(1) 0.151 0.176 0.198 0.167 0.217
A(2) 0.679 0.333 0.353 0.296 0.477
No. of observation 5794 10102 6899 6027 9665
Note: The general formula of Generalized Entropy measures
is given by GE(α). The values of GE measures vary between
0 and∞, with zero representing an equal distribution and hi-
gher value representing a higher level of inequality.The par-
ameter α in GE class represents the weight given to distance
between incomes at different parts of the income distribution
distribution,and can take any real value. For lower values of α
GE is more sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distri-
bution, and for higher values GE is more sensitive to changes.
GE(1) is Theil’s T index, GE(0), also known as Theil’s L, and
sometimes referred to as the mean log deviation measure.
Note: Atkinson index presents the percentage of total income
that a given society would have to forego in order to have mo-
re shares of income between its citizens. This measure depen-
de on the degree of society aversion to inequality A(α), where
a higher value entails greater social utility or willingness by i-
ndividuals to accept smaller incomes in exchange for a more
equal distribution.
Source: Calculated from CHIP 1999,2002, 2007, 2008, and
2013 urban household survey
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an increase regardless of measures in the long run, although the financial crisis
decreased the wage inequality in a short period. Gini coefficient rises from 0.293
in 1999 to 0.364 in 2007. Mean log deviation, which is GE(0), increases from
0.164 to 0.221, ratio between p90 and p10 increases from 4.282 to 5.375. After
2008, percentile ration between the highest 10% and the lowest 10 % increased
by 13%, much more than any other measures. Gini coefficient stands almost
same in this period and mean log deviation increased by 6%. If we take a closer
look, we will find that the changes in wage distribution between 1999 and 2007
is more salient in the upper tail of wages, while the rise between 2008 and 2013
is more salient in lower tail of the distribution. We can see this percentile ratio of
p90/p50 increases from 1.916 to 2.389, while it barely changes between 2008 and
2013. GE indexes reflect the same story. GE(2) greatly increased between 1999
and 2007, while remained steady between 2008 and 2013, representing inequality
was more sensitive to upper tail of wage distribution before the financial crisis.
On the other hand, GE(-1) increased by, more than, 50% after the financial crisis,
representing wage inequality after 2008 was more sensitive to the lower tail of
distribution.
Table 1.2: Population share of subgroups with different personal
and job characteristics (%)
1999 2002 2007 2008 2013
Gender
Male 0.56 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.56
Age
below 25 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
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25-35 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.25
35-45 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.34
45-55 0.27 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.27
55-65 0.048 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.08
over 65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Education
below high school 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.32
high school 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.18
specialized and polytechnic school 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.11 0.31
undergraduate 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.27 0.18
graduate 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.02
Occupation
principle of government institution 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.03
manager of enterprise 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02
professional individual 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.19
clerk and officer 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.18
manufacturing workers 0.34 0.28 0.15 0.27 0.19
commercial and service people 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.20 0.31
others 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07
Type of labor contract
Permanent staff 0.75 0.51 0.34 0.35 0.25
long-term contract 0.19 0.21 0.42 0.51 0.25
others 0.06 0.28 0.23 0.14 0.50
Ownership type of firms
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government institution 0.29 0.31 0.37 0.36 0.24
SOE 0.54 0.31 0.18 0.23 0.17
COE 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05
FDI 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.03
Private 0.04 0.18 0.32 0.28 0.52
Region of firms
metropolis 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.09
eastern region 0.32 0.30 0.39 0.22 0.32
middle region 0.18 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.35
western region 0.35 0.27 0.20 0.20 0.23
Size of firms
1-100 0.42 0.51 0.49 0.51
101-500 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.19
501-1000 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.20
more than 1000 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.1
Sources: Calculated from the CHIP 1999, 2002, 2007, 2008, and 2013
urban household survey
We divide our explanatory variables into 8 subgroups featuring different worker
or job characteristics. Among worker characteristics, we distinguish subgroups
defined by gender, age, education, and years of working experience. Among job
characteristics, we distinguish the ownership types of firms the worker is em-
ployed into five groups, namely government institution, state-owned enterprise
(SOE), urban collective-owned enterprise (COE), foreign-owned or joint venture
(FDI), and private firms. We divide workers’ occupation into 7 categories in order
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to identify changes in wage inequality occurred among different kinds of skills.
Given the substantial compositional change among different types of contract that
workers sign with firms, we break type of contract down into permanent contract
(including national public servant, public institution permanent staff and fixed-
contract employees of state-owned enterprises), long term contract (labor con-
tracts which are over one year), and others (including short-term contract less
than one year, employment with temporary contract or without contract ). We
also discuss how firm’s location and size affect wage inequality. The population
share of different subgroups are shown in table 3.2.
Since the seminal work of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) in the early 1970s,
it has been a fertile area of research for new decomposition methods over the past
decades, each with their limitations and advantages. Various methods are used
to decompose change in the shape of wage distribution based on different con-
cepts, such as the disparities among groups, or distributional changes over time,
or decomposition into explanatory factors. Wage inequality among individuals is
examined by applying various inequality decomposition methods to the household
data describing observable characteristics of the work force.
Our first method, following Fields (2003) and Brewer and Wren-Lewis (2016),
uses the regression-based decomposition. It starts with an income-generating
function, where income is linearly related to a certain number of ”variables” or
”factors” :
lnY i =
N∑
c=0
βcXci + i (1)
where Yi is an individual’s income, (Xci)c∈[0,N] a set of observed variables and 
is the error term. Building on theorem on decomposition by additive factor com-
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ponents from Shorrocks (1982), we define a ”relative factor inequality weight”
S c to be the percentage of income inequality that is attributed to the c’th factor –
for instance, how much of the inequality of total income is accounted for by the
inequality in labor income.
Sc(Y) = Cov[βˆctXc,Y]/ˆ2(Y) (2.a)
such that
∑
C
S c = 1 (2.b)
Virtually all inequality indices satisfy conditions mentioned above, including the
Gini coefficient, the Atkinson index, the generalized entropy family, the coeffi-
cient of variation, and various percentile measures. It is also applicable for the
decomposition for a particular index, i, between time t and time t1 and t2,
S˙ c I˙ − S cI (3)
By synthesizing the decomposition method proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce
(1991) and Fields (2003) , Yun (2006) came up with an approach to explain the
differences in inequality by the difference not only in coefficients, characteristics,
and residuals, but also in price and quantity effects. There are altogether three
steps in its approach. First, replace the coefficients of the earnings regression
equation of one period with those of another period, while maintaining the indi-
vidual characteristics and residuals unchanged. Second, decompose inequality
of income measurements of both period from the first step into contribution of
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individual factors. Third, compute the variance of log-earnings , and decompose
the differences in the variance of log-earnings between time a and time b.
σya
2−σyb2 =
∑k=K−1
k=1
(S ky∗ ·σy∗2−S kyb ·σyb2)+
∑k=K−1
k=1
(S kya·σya2−S ky∗ ·σy∗2)+(σea2−σeb2)
where the first term represents characteristics effect (characteristics or quantity
effect), the second coefficients effects (coefficients or price effect) and last term
residuals effects.
In order to guard against error in our own calculations, we also calculate the shares
of each source in total inequality using the Stata command ‘ineqfac’, written by
Jenkins (2009). The ineqfac program provides an exact decomposition of the
inequality of total income into inequality contributions from each of the factor
components of total income.
Our second decomposition partitions the population into non-overlapping sub-
groups. Using inequality measures as generalized entropy family, we can divide
the total inequality into inequalities within each group and inequality between
groups,
ITotal = IBetween + IWithin (4)
Here, IBetween is between-group inequality, arise from mean income distribution
from different subgroup, and IWithin is within-group inequality, stands for the
weighted sum of inequality within each group. Here we use the weights of
income share and population share of each group.
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1.4 Result
Decomposition by individual characteristics
We begin by decomposing changes in wage inequality by individual character-
istics with multivariate regressions. This allows us to see the effects of all our
characteristics simultaneously. We include two types of characteristics, observ-
able individual characteristics and job characteristics. Among individual charac-
teristics, we explore how factors like gender, age, experience, and education level
affect wage inequality. Among job characteristics, we investigate how factors like
occupation, industry sector, size of company, type of labor contract of job, region,
and ownership of company, are related to wage inequality. Residual term in our
model represents the unobservable characteristics. Table 3 shows the estimated
share of each characteristics in total inequality. And then we show the absolute
contributions of each factors to the change of wage inequality among different
years. Here we use 10000 times variance of log income as the measure of wage
inequality.
Table 3.4 shows that, contribution of ’residual’ terms play a significant role in
worker force wage inequality during the past decade. Far more than half of the
wage inequality can be attributed to residuals. However, the share of ’residual
term’ did experience several ups and downs over this periods. It accounted for
70.6% of wage inequality in 1999. Its share dropped by almost 6%, to 65.8% in
2002 when China was in the process of officially joining WTO and slowly climbed
18
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to 68% in 2007, 5 years after China’s entry to WTO. Financial crisis clearly di-
minished its share in 2008. However, it rose sharply again after 2008, and peaked
at 75% in 2013, indicating that globalization in China substantially changed the
composition of wage structure.
What is the most striking is that observable worker characteristics act completely
divergently in wage inequality over the study period. A number of factors used
to account for certain part of wage inequality have disappeared or reversed their
effect on wage distribution. Contrarily, several other factors grew to contribute
more and more to wage inequality. It is not difficult to find that, after 2008, indi-
vidual characteristics like age and working experience no longer play any role in
the changes in wage inequality.
The contribution of education shows a completely different path to that of age
and experience. Education’s share shows consecutive growth, increasing from
4% in 1999 to almost 8% in 2013, twice as that in 1999. What is worth noticing
is that in 2013, education became to be the major factor among observed factors
dis-equalizing wage distribution, suggesting a great wage disparity among people
with different education backgrounds. The return to education greatly shaped the
wage distribution 10 years after China’s entry into the global market. This is con-
trary to the literature asserting that education did not play any significant role in
the changes in wage inequality(e.g., Appleton, Song and Xia (2014)). Skill biased
technology continues to influence labor market and wage structure. It exerts more
impact on wage inequality long after trade liberations than soon after it.
The share of gender experienced huge increase between 2002 and 2007 and stands
steady at 3% after 2007. However, it shows no more significant impact on wage
inequality.
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Now we change our focus from individual characteristics to work attributes. In-
dustry type plays quite a trivial role in wage inequality. Region explains a signifi-
cant part in wage inequality in the past 20 years. It almost dominated one third of
observable- characteristics share that accounted for wage inequality before 2013.
This is closely related to the regional policy in China, to encourage some areas
and some people to become well-off first, to gradually eliminate poverty, and to
achieve common prosperity. The share of regional differences peaks in 2007, with
a share of 11%. But 5 years after the financial crisis, its share greatly decreases to
3.5%, reflecting a more equally distributed wage structure across regions. It pos-
sibly benefited from the policy that are developed for middle and eastern region
in China. However, our subgroup decomposition shows that this equally develop-
ment across regions disguises a divergence within each regions.
In terms of job characteristics, we find that, as much as disparities documented
among firms’ ownership type in different literature, ownership type of firms
played only a trivial role in explaining changes in inequality. Its share dropped
from 5.5% in 1999 to 0.1% in 2008 and continued to decrease to negative, indi-
cating that ownership type of firms mitigated the wage inequality, offset around
1% of wage inequality among individuals.
From what we can learn from Table 3.4, the share of occupation, however, does
not seem to change significantly during the past two decade. It stood at 5.3% in
1999 and slightly increased in 2002 and again decreased to 5% in 2007, 5 years
after the great trade liberation in China. While, the results from subgroup analysis
do show that the share of composition of occupation changed considerably. Dif-
ferent occupations act differently as the rapid development of China’s economy.
We can observe that firm size has not been closely correlated with worker’s wages
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Table 1.5: Changes in wage inequality decomposed
into characteristic price and quantity effects
year total residual
gender age education experience
P Q P Q P Q P Q
1999-2002 -30 -1265 609 -443 388 -262 511 8.6 -311 217
2002-2007 3059 1808 914 -57 -620 -231 414 -83 630 -127
2007-2008 -8196 -5996 -336 -83 0 -62 -4749 4759 -166 160
2008-2013 22900 20936 13 577 1 -7 8 2146 -19 -884
through out the decades, in spite of the fact that a large body of literature argu-
ing that bigger firms with higher productivity provides higher salaries (Brown and
Medoff 1989; Bayard and Troske 1999; Lallemand, Plasman and Rycx 2007).
It is anyhow surprising that the contribution of the type of contract that workers
have with firms shows a steady growth. It is fair to say that the transformation
from a planned economy to a market economy substantially shifted the structure
of contract types. With significant migrations of workforce from rural areas to
urban areas, more and more short-term contracts or temporary contracts emerged.
The share of short-term contracts or temporary contracts rapidly increased, from
less than 10% in 1999 to more than 50% in 2013 (see Table 1). These workers
are mainly found in “”3D” jobs”, namely dirty, dangerous, and disreputable jobs.
Our subgroups decomposition in the next sections shows that rather than dispari-
ties between different types of contracts, it is the divergency within same type of
contracts notably impacts the overall wage inequality.
Following Yun (2006), we decompose the changes in wage inequality into “price”
(P, or coefficients effects) and “quantity” (Q, or characteristics effect ) effects of
each factor. Table 3.4 displays the decomposed result.
Whilst we may be able to identify the various contributory effects, there is no way
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Table 1.6: Changes in wage inequality decomposed
into characteristic price and quantity effects
year
contract sector occupation ownership region size
P Q P Q P Q P Q P Q P Q
1999-2002 -513 1014 -361 -106 -1947 2384 -528 32 1285 -732 0 0
2002-2007 407 -17 0 -167 -152 909 -1343 -194 999 570 -523 813
2007-2008 568 -798 0 0 629 -1558 1613 -116 -1471 341 -60 -63
2008-2013 -1264 3124 -610 708 464 -572 15 -1958 -554 -1146 -3 -99
Source: Calculated from CHIP 1999,2002, 2007, 2008, and 2013 urban household survey
of knowing the quantitative importance of their impact on aggregate inequality.
This is particularly relevant when the effects are working in opposite direction.
Table 4 3.6 displays changes in income inequality decomposed into characteristic
price and quantity effects. Here we use 1000 times variance of log wage as the
measure of income inequality. The decomposition method proposed by Yun
(2006) gives us insight of both aggregate and detailed decompositions of changes
in earnings inequality, making it possible for us identify what are the factors
behind wage inequality in different period.
1.4.1 1999 to 2002
There is no significant changes in wage inequality measured by the variance of
log wage between 1999 and 2002. The total change shows a slight decrease at
-30. However, compared with almost ignorable movement in total change in
wage inequality, residual item presents a substantial decrease in change, stands
at -1264, indicating while other observable factors push up the wage inequality
between 1999 and 2002, unobservable characteristics of individuals greatly
equalize the wage distribution. During this period, the privatization process
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was on and brought out large amount of individuals to engage out from the
planned economy to market economy which was brand new to China. Observable
characteristics like education or experiecnce play a relatively umimportant role
in this immature market, however unobservable characteristics such as talent and
opportunity are more likely to stand out. With the rapid development of economy,
individual were pushed to make their fortunes in thar economic wave.
Region, contract, education, and occupation are the factors that devoted almost
evenly much to the increase of wage inequality in this period. Region shows
remarkable positive price effect, suggesting most wage inequality across regions
was out from the different economic growth pace, whereas southern regions
apparently shows a greater return to work. In the case of contracts type, however,
quantity effect absolutely dominates and shows a opposite direction to price
effect. The return to different contract is equalizing. But it had to give way
to the substantial divergence in contracts type. If we take a look at the change
of composition of contract, we will find that share of short term or temporary
contracts is growing rapidly. It was the distribution of wage of individuals with
short and temporary contracts that contribute most to the wage inequity. The
education level is also positive with the rise in wage inequality. Table 3.6 shows,
even though both price effect and quantity effect are positive, quantity effects
plays no role in the change of wage inequality in this period. Behind the similar
amount of general contribution with the other three factors we discussed in this
paragraph, occupation presents a markable convergence between price effect and
quantity effect. Price effect is negative with the extent to -1947. At the same time,
quantity effect also stood at high level of 2384. If we take close look at the various
occupation types, we will find that it is the growing uneven distribution among
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commercial and service occupations greatly shaped the effect that occupation
exerts on wage inequality.
Sector and ownership both have an equalizing effect on the wage. Although
neither is statistically significant, both are consistent with overall trend of change
in wage inequality. Negative price effect of ownership type is mainly made up
from the decreasing role it plays in wage distribution. The share contribution
ownership type makes to wage inequality gradually falls to 0, as we mentioned
before. Same logic also applies to the change of sectors.
1.4.2 2002-2007
Change in wage inequality between 2002 and 2007 is more vivid than that
between 1999 and 2002. The variance of log income increases around 8% and
almost 60% is attributed to the rising inequality accounted by the residual item.
Age and gender pose a similar amount of effect on the rise in wage inequity
in this period, in opposite direction, though. Compared with other individual
characteristics, namely education level, working experience, their absolute
contributions are relatively more significant. In particular, the return to male
displays more growth than ever. Meanwhile, return to age shows equalizing
effect, which is totally another story from that in 1999. As a result, the effect of
these two individual characteristics cancel out. Experience in this period plays
a more important role than in the earlier period, with price effect shifting from
a negative correlation to a positive correlation with wage inequality. Experience
matters more 5 years after China opened its economy to world, and the return to
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experience increased at same time.
During this period, the characteristics of job displays more important impacts.
Both the price effect and quantity effects push up the wage inequality. From our
subgroup data, we can see it is the rising wage inequality in middle part of China
has contributed most to the across region inequality, while back in 2002, the
wage distribution in middle region acts to mitigate the overall wage inequality.
On the contrary to the region, ownership types of firms has acted in a reverse
direction to affect the change in wage inequality. Both price effect and quantity
effect is in negative correlation with the wage inequality. But numbers show that
effect of where a firm is located and the type ownership accidentally cancels out.
Meanwhile,occupation continues its positive correlation with wage inequality,
mainly made up from the positive contribution of quantity effects. However,
compared with the numbers in 1999, both price effect and quantity effect dropped,
indicating a more remote relation with wage inequality.
1.4.3 2008-2013
After a remarkable decrease during the financial crisis, wage inequity rose almost
60% in 2013. What is most striking is that the absolute contribution of residual
items amounts to 90% of this change. In other words, unobserved factors greatly
push up the wage inequality, dwarfing any other observable factors. If we take a
close look at the change of residual items, we can find that price effect does not
play much role in this period, but quantity effects explains the whole wage in-
equality. Unchanged price effect suggests that return to individual characteristics
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holds same from 2008 to 2013. Significant change in quantity effects reveals that
wage structure has been manifesting a more divergent distribution as a result of
compositional change among worker heterogeneity.
Gender, age and experience shows a significant small relation with the
change during this 5 years. In particular, factors of age almost disappeared. Nor
does experience show much impact. What does stand out is the education level.
In 2008, the price effect and quantity effects almost cancels out, leaves not much
influence on the change of wage inequality. However, in 2013, education level
accounts for almost 94% of wage inequality attributed to individual’s observable
characteristics. Even though it does not contribute much to the increase of
wage inequality, price effect shifts from roughly -5000 in 2008 to positive in
2013. With the overall wage inequality decrease in 2008, the price effect acts
to decrease more wage inequality. While, when wage inequality picks up after
2008, the return to education increases at a slower pace. Quantity effect keeps
affecting wage inequality positively and it is the major factor that explains the
increase inequality among observable characteristics, suggesting that disparities
among individuals with different education levels overrode that among any other
subgroups. Our subgroup decomposition shows that wage inequality is more
salient within the upper tail and lower tail, rather than that between upper tail and
lower tail.
Region and ownership type of firms, however, both play the role of
alleviating the rise of wage inequality. In terms of the contribution of region,
for the first time, both price effect and quantity effect contribute to reduce the
wage inequality. And also for the first time, that the quantity effects contribute
more, which is in line with the fact that the middle region wage inequality
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being prominent in the period between 2002 and 2007 is getting smaller after
the financial crisis, along with the policy of ’developing middle and western
region’ in China. We are also surprised to learn that ownership type of firms
continues to mitigate the increase of wage inequality, which contracts with most
of the study arguing that ownership plays a significant role in widening the wage
gap in urban areas. Seen from our result, neither does FDI nor SOE make any
statistically important part in wage inequality, but the wage distribution among
private companies acts to reduce the overall wage inequality among individuals.
Decomposition by population subgroup
This part is to take a closer look at the distribution of wages among population
subgroups. The exact decomposition will be to decompose the change of wage
inequality measurements into four subjects interpreted, respectively, as the effect
of inter-temporal changes in within subgroup inequality, the influence of changes
in the population proportions of the subgroups on the ’within group’ and ’between
group’ units, and the impact of changes in relative mean wage of subgroups. The
computation of these demographic components allows us to identify the contribu-
tions of various factors to the trend in aggregate inequality, measured by mean log
deviation (MLD). Table 3.7 to table 3.13 reports the changes in the overall wage
inequality value derived from the CHIP data, along with the break-down into four
components. Due to the substantially minuscule of the annual values, we artifi-
cially rose the actual figure by a factor of 1,000. The values designated to the three
intervals over 15 years shows an evident moderate downward trend in the first two
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sub-periods but a sharp upward trend in the last sub-period. The second column of
these tables displays the ceteris paribus impact of changes within each subgroups.
The third and fourth columns indicate the impact on the within age groups and
between group components, respectively, of changes in the population character-
istics structure. The last column gives the contribution of relative changes in the
mean incomes of the subgroups.
In broad, we divide the population into following eight subgroups: age
gender
education
occupation
region
ownership
contract
sector
We compare the wage inequality occurred among three periods, 1999-2002, 2002-
2007,2008-2013. Here we use mean log deviation(MLD *1000) as the measure of
wage inequality. And then we decompose it into contributions through three ori-
gins: within- group inequality—inequality changes attributed to changes in wage
inequality within groups population effects—inequality changed due to changes
in population structure of subgroups relative income effects—inequality changes
resulted from shifting relative wages between groups.
We replicate the decomposition approach applied in Jenkins’s age group
categories:
below 25;
25-35;
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Table 1.7: By age group-subgroup decomposition of
wage inequality changes
Period Aggregate
inequal-
ity
Within-
group
inequal-
ity
Population
change
(within)
Population
change
(mean)
Relative
wage
1999-2002 29.8 29.2 0.2 -9.2 9.6
2002-2007 25.8 27.8 -1.2 -2.9 7.1
2008-2013 57.9 49.2 5.4 8.8 -5.5
35-45;
45-55;
55-65;
over 65;
As is visible in Table 3.7, inequality within age groups played the major
role throughout the two decades, and inequality between age groups only played a
secondary role. The between- group effects never explained more than one-tenth
of the change in inequality. Population effects always weighed more in between
groups wage inequality than in within-group inequality, indicating the composi-
tion of the population experienced relatively more transforms between different
age groups than within the same groups. It is surprising to see that changes in rel-
ative price show a downward trend. Between 2008 and 2013, changes in relative
price turned to negative, indicating the relative wage between groups is decreas-
ing and equalizing the wage distribution between groups. Due to the cancel out
among population effects and relative price effects, between groups effects did not
explain much of the rising wage inequality. On the other hand, changes in within
age groups increased sharply during the past decades. Despite the minor decrease
in the magnitude of growth over 2002 and 2007, the average GE(0) within age
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groups increased from 0.18 to 0.28 in 2013. In particular, inequality within the
groups aged 55 to 65 increased most, even though its little share in the whole
population. Individuals aged 35 to 45 take up more than one-third of the whole
population, followed by people aged between 45-55. However, wage inequality
among these two subgroups shows a stable trend. Distribution within age group
below 25 fluctuated most. Its growth was in a downward trend before 2008 but
soon picked up in 2013.
Table 3.8 shows the results of decomposition between gender subgroups.
Despite a large body of literature arguing how gender difference enlarges the
overall inequality, between-group wage inequality effects hardly explain the
change of wage inequality. Within-group wage inequality effects account for
more than 90% of the changes. In 2007 and 2008, wage distribution within
female even overpassed that within male groups. Population effects barely played
any parts in distribution through out the whole period, although females share
kept dropping. Relative wage and between group population have been quite
volatile through this period, however these two almost cancels out, leaving not
much room for the wage distribution between groups.
Table 1.8: By gender group-subgroup decomposition of
wage inequality changes
Period Aggregate
inequal-
ity
Within-
group
inequal-
ity
Population
change
(within)
Population
change
(mean)
Relative
wage
1999-2002 29.8 28.2 0 0 1.0
2002-2007 25.9 20.6 0 -6.1 11.2
2008-2013 57.9 58.1 0 1.3 -1.6
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We divide education levels into five groups: below high school;
high school;
specialized and polytechnic school;
undergraduate;
graduate;
Table 3.9 shows the results of decomposition between education sub-
groups. As visible as it is, changes in wage inequality is largely accounted for
by within groups wage disparities. What strikes us most is that the wage inequal-
ity within the least educated group has been the most salient one and it shows a
prominent increase trend. With the steep increase in population share 2008 on-
wards, wage disparities within the lowest education level subgroup has substan-
tially pushed up the overall wage inequality between 2008 and 2013. Among the
other education level groups, wage inequality within the high school group has
been the one with the largest jump. Contract to most literature arguing polarize
in wage inequality between different education levels, our literature shows that
the higher is the education level, the fewer wage disparities within groups. As
the case in between-group inequality, even though it has not played many roles
in the change of overall wage inequality, it does experience quite a fluctuation.
Table 1.9: By education group-subgroup decomposition of
wage inequality changes
Period Aggregate
inequal-
ity
Within-
group
inequal-
ity
Population
change
(within)
Population
change
(mean)
Relative
wage
1999-2002 31.3 24.5 0 1.0 2.0
2002-2007 25.8 21.2 -3.0 -48.5 56.3
2008-2013 50.2 33.8 15.5 162.7 -161.7
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Table 1.10: By occupation group-subgroup decomposition of
wage inequality changes
Period Aggregate
inequal-
ity
Within-
group
inequal-
ity
Population
change
(within)
Population
change
(mean)
Relative
wage
1999-2002 29.9 16.6 7.2 25.1 -18
2002-2007 25.1 18.2 8.2 29.5 -32.1
2008-2013 58.1 53.8 5.1 45.2 -46.9
Population effects between groups dominate the population effects within groups,
but it always cancels out with relative price effect between groups. Between 2002
and 2007, population effects between groups acted to decrease discrepancy with
the magnitude at 48.5, far larger than population effect within groups. However
relative price between groups, however, with a relatively larger level of 56, signif-
icantly leveraged the overall inequality. Between 2008 and 2013, the direction of
these factors reversed with an even more astonishing magnitude. It is surprising
to find out that share of individuals with higher than bachelor degree significantly
shrunk during 2008 and 2013, even though the considerable expansion policy has
been implemented among Chinese Universities.
We divide occupation into eight groups: principle of government institu-
tion;
manager of enterprise;
professional individual;
clerk and officer;
workers;
commercial and service people;
others;
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Table 3.10 shows the results of decomposition between occupation sub-
groups. Similarly, changes in within group inequality accounted for the most of
changes in overall wage inequality. To take a closer look at within group dispar-
ities, it is not difficult to find out that distribution within the manager group has
been the one with the greatest disparity throughout this period. While it slightly
decreased during 1999 and 2008, it resumed high inequality in 2013. Following
managers, workforce in commercial experienced the most substantial increase,
along with its pronounced upsurge in population share. Workers, on the other
hand, saw a gradual decrease in its share of the population, dropping from 33%
in 1999 to less than 20% in 2013. Inequality within workers, however, remained
stable over this period. Turning to inequality between groups, price effects, sur-
prisingly act to mitigate the overall wage inequality. Population effects within
groups hardly shed much light on overall wage inequality. Population effects be-
tween groups, on the contrary, shows a robust increase. As high as the shift in
shares of population among occupations, the reverse evolution of population ef-
fects and price effect wind up offsetting each other. We can conclude that in the
light of occupation, most of the inequality is out from within group distribution,
in particular, led by wage disparities within managers and a great increase in wage
disparities among commercial and service jobs.
We divide labor contract into 3 groups:
Permanent staff;
long-term contract;
short-term contract;
Table 3.11 shows the results of decomposition between labor’s contract
type subgroups. In general, it is hard to tell which factor, within-group inequality
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or between groups inequality plays a relatively more important role in the change
of gross wage inequality. Changes in within groups have been climbing steadily,
indicating that wage distribution within the same contract group has been going
up. In 2013, it explained half of the overall wage inequality growth. Inequality
values assigned to these three types reveals that there is no much change in wage
distribution within permanent staffs and long-term contract workforces. Wage
distribution among labors of short-term contract and no contract, however, shows
a distinct increase. Furthermore, population effects have been quite vivid between
groups, which is in parallel with the great transform occurred in population share,
where permanent workers used to dominate the gross employee but step by step,
gave its way to employees with short-term contract or with no contract. Relative
price between different groups has been acting to level off the gross inequality,
but its effects almost offset by population effects. We can conclude that among
the subgroups with different types of contracts, both inequalities of within groups
and of between groups have an impact on the overall wage inequality. Effects of
between groups have been playing a relatively more critical role, and the effect of
within-group inequality has been growing considerably.
We divide region into four groups:
Table 1.11: By contract group-subgroup decomposition of
wage inequality changes
Period Aggregate
inequal-
ity
Within-
group
inequal-
ity
Population
change
(within)
Population
change
(mean)
Relative
wage
1999-2002 30.0 3.6 21.4 70.4 -64.2
2002-2007 25.7 22.2 3.2 17.5 -16.8
2008-2013 57.9 25.3 27.1 124.2 -118.8
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metropolis
eastern region;
middle region;
western region;
Table 3.12 shows the results of decomposition across regions. The
pattern among effects of within-group and between-groups is quite similar to
what we analyzed above. The within-group effects are as usual dominant, and
between-group effects have been quite volatile but always wind up canceling out
between relative price effects and population effects. Changes in relative wage
between groups turn to negative in 2013, indicating that the distribution between
regions in 2013 grows more equally than that in 2008. Change from negative
to positive in population effects between groups reflects that the composition of
labor force between regions acts to growth the wage inequality. If we take a closer
look at the changes in population share between different regions, we will see
that, even though the share of population in eastern regions and western regions
increased, wage inequality in the central region has been growing in an even
faster pace. However, the population effects between regions do not play much
part as they are almost canceled out by the relative wage disparities between
Table 1.12: By region group-subgroup decomposition of
wage inequality changes
Period Aggregate
inequal-
ity
Within-
group
inequal-
ity
Population
change
(within)
Population
change
(mean)
Relative
wage
1999-2002 31.9 25.9 0 54.2 -50.3
2002-2007 23.7 18.8 1.1 -50.2 56.1
2008-2013 57.8 53.4 10.7 69.1 -75
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regions. Turn to within-region wage inequality. Eastern region not only shows
greatest inequality throughout this period but also shows the the most significant
rise. Metropolis shows the least increase in wage inequality. We can conclude
here that it is the wage inequality within the eastern region contribute most to the
overall regional wage inequality.
We divide the ownership of firms into 4 groups: government institution;
SOE;
COE;
FDI;
Private; Table 3.13 shows the results of decomposition between ownership types
of firms. As always, it is the changes in wage inequality within groups have a
relatively more tremendous impact on overall change in wage inequality. It is not
a surprise to see that mean wage in FDIs outnumbers that in any other subgroups
throughout the whole time, but it is astonishing to see that it is the inequality
within private firms contributed most to the wage inequality over 1999 to 2013.
As we can see that disparity with private firms has always been the greatest
one. Furthermore, the population share of workers in private firms considerably
increased, with more than half of the whole employee in 2013. Supreme possible
Table 1.13: By ownership group-subgroup decomposition of
wage inequality changes
Period Aggregate
inequal-
ity
Within-
group
inequal-
ity
Population
change
(within)
Population
change
(mean)
Relative
wage
1999-2002 31.9 21.7 30.3 57.4 -47
2002-2007 23.7 18.8 1.1 -50.2 56.1
2008-2013 57.8 53.4 10.1 69.1 -75.3
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reason behind this is that more and more private firm get engaged in the global
market with sharp disparities in productivity and composition of worker force,
which enlarged the wage disparities.
1.5 Conclusion
To our best knowledge, our decomposition has been the most detailed one among
the literature studying wage inequality in China. It has provided four original
insights into the evolution of wage inequality between 1999 and 2013, before
the trade liberation took place and 10 years after. The results in this paper help
to identify important factors among different time periods and which population
subgroup contributed to the overall wage inequality.
We find a number of factors that have been surprisingly acting to mitigate
the wage inequality since 1999, which is contrary to the argument in most of liter-
atures. First, many papers argue that FDI has been an important reason that wage
inequality grows large. However, we find that in fact, ownership type actually
did not play much role in overall urban wage inequality. In the recent period, the
wage distribution among different types even helps to equalize the wage dispar-
ities, primary due to the increase in wage of lower tail of distribution. Second,
wage distribution between regions also acts to pull inequality down, primarily due
to the change of population structure. The share of population has been getting
larger in the western and eastern regions, where the within region inequality has
been relatively smaller compared with the other regions, given the fact that it is
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the wage inequality within region that takes up far more weight in overall wage
inequality than between region wage inequality.
However, several factors concerning the upwards trend of wage inequality
are worth paying attention to. In light of the individual characteristics, wage in-
equality among different education levels has been more and more prominent. It
explains nearly 8% of the overall wage inequality during 2008 and 2013, which
makes it the most important observable factors. The most striking fact might be
that the wage disparities among the least education level outpaced that among
other education levels and accounts for more than one third of the change of wage
inequality from 2008 onwards. Meanwhile, our results indicate that wage inequal-
ity within private firms also climbs steeply since 2002. It is partly due to the share
of labor force employed in private firms expanding twice through the whole period
and partly due to the divergence of return to skill within private firms. Matched
data between firms and workers will be required to tangle the mechanism under-
lying the skill premium within private firms.
More broadly, our study has underlined the value of decomposing the in-
equality changes in a broad range of economic dimension. This is mostly demon-
strated in the display of a series of absolute contributions among subgroups where
the effects are working in opposite directions. Moreover, we have found that fac-
tors like region and ownership have casted different effects on overall wage in-
equality. We also notice that other than inequality among the upper tier of wage
distribution being salient in developed countries, it is the lowest tail of wage dis-
tribution that contributes more in the recent years. It exposes the requirement to
pay more attention to migration and poorest class in China.
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